Freedom and happiness

Abstract

Now that we understand what freedom is, we can consider why Spinoza regards it as so valuable. To this end, this chapter examines the role freedom plays in his ethical project. Drawing on the ancient Greeks, Spinoza conceives of ethics as helping us to determine the value of our various goods so that we may plan our lives for attaining our highest good. Attaining our highest good, on this view, provides us with eudaimonia, an ethically rich conception of happiness that encompasses flourishing and perfection. Unlike the ancients, however, Spinoza holds that freedom plays a central role in our eudaimonia. This is because eudaimonia comes from virtue, which Spinoza essentially equates with freedom, for he understands freedom as acting from one's own power and defines virtue as equivalent to one's power (4def8). It follows that freedom is important to Spinoza's ethics for the same reason as virtue, because it is constitutive of our highest good and, more fundamentally, because it serves as the measure by which we determine the value of all things. A central conclusion of this reading is that Spinoza departs from the dominant tradition in modern ethics, which regards freedom as important because it is essential to our moral agency or personhood, the basis for special consideration we afford moral agents, such as dignity or respect. Rather, freedom matters, for Spinoza, because it is integral to our flourishing and happiness.