Free Will and Action

Abstract

When agents are in circumstances that do not constrain their choices in any way they can be said to enjoy freedom of action. They are able to whatever they want to do. However freedom of action, so understood, is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral responsibility. It is not sufficient because spiders, mice, infants, and the like, all enjoy such freedom of action, at least when placed in suitable unconstraining circumstances, but none of them are evem capable of being morally responsible. It is not necessary because people who falsely believe that they enjoy freedom of action may yet be morally responsible. what is both necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility is rather freedom of the will. Agents enjoy freedom of the will when they possess a dual capacity. On the one hand, they must possess the capacity to form well-justifyed beliefs about what they have reasons to do. On the other hand, they must have self-control: the capacity to bring their desires into line with their reflectively formed beliefs about their reasons. Many urge that moral responsibility is impossible in a deterministic world. But whether or not this is so can be seen to depend on whether rational capacities, quite generally, are possible in a deterministic world. It is a question for further investigation whether this is so.