Abstract
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889. As a textual basis, I take Brentano's communication, presented to the philosophical community of Vienna in March 1889, entitled "On the concept of truth" (Über den Begriff der Wahrheit), and I provide a systematic exposition of Brentano's analysis of the problems surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. My analysis explains how Brentano reinter-preted the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence within the conceptual framework of his descriptive psychology.
Highlights
An interpretative key for presenting Brentano’s concept of truthIn order to present the analysis, problem, and solution, but, in particular, the concept of truth as formulated by Franz Brentano, I will follow his footsteps in the systematic exposition of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889
In order to present the analysis, problem, and solution, but, in particular, the concept of truth as formulated by Franz Brentano, I will follow his footsteps in the systematic exposition of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence
Summary
In order to present the analysis, problem, and solution, but, in particular, the concept of truth as formulated by Franz Brentano, I will follow his footsteps in the systematic exposition of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. The fundamental point of my research demonstrated that, by assuming the interpretation introduced by Chisholm (1969), the new description of psychical acts (as a relation between the parts of consciousness) introduces some fundamental changes to the Brentanian theory of intentionality It describes two distinguishable types of intentional relations which characterize, on the one hand, the intentional acts of presentation and, on the other hand, the intentional acts of judgment. The description of intentional activity of the act of judging as the class of merely distinctional parts of the primary and secondary psychical relation (Diploseenergie) is the Brentanian fundamental assumption for the analysis of the concept of truth as correspondence. I move onto the textual analysis without losing sight of this assumption
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