Alethic Pluralism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth

Abstract

This chapter explores the ways a correspondence theory of truth can embrace both relativism about truth and a view that accommodates the appearance of pluralism about truth. It argues that the correspondence theory and the realism it implies is perfectly compatible the idea that one can ’carve up’ reality in any number of different ways. This allows one to give some sense to the idea that truth is relative to a conceptual framework and, consequently, that one can express truths within one conceptual framework that one cannot express in another. The chapter also argues that the correspondence theorist has the resources to ’co-opt’ whatever initial plausibility alethic pluralism might have. The theory can allow for the intelligibility of alternative conceptions of ’truth.’ These alternative conceptions of truth are best construed as faux conceptions, which are compatible with the correspondence theorist’s conception of truth as correspondence to facts.