Abstract

Using a new evidence from the Russian, French and British archives and the recently published diplomatic documents, this paper explores the main trends of the Soviet policy with respect to France between the “decisive turn” in the War in 1943 and the Yalta conference in 1945. Reappraising the traditional narrative about the successful and friendly Soviet-French cooperation, author underlines the pragmatic reasons which governed Moscow’s diplomacy. Stalin’s and Soviet diplomats’ attitude to de Gaulle wasn’t static and evolved during the war, though the basic features persisted. Stalin attuned his French policy to the dynamics of the relations inside the “Grand Alliance”. The aim of the Soviet-French rapprochement for Moscow was to provide a possible ally in a case of new war against Germany; to support de Gaulle, whom Moscow preferred to British and American proteges; to facilitate a work of the French communists and a growth of their influence, to prevent an anti-Soviet drift of France and to strengthen the Soviet positions in the “Polish question”

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