Fragmentierte Zeitlichkeit Ein phänomenologisches Modell der Schizophrenie

Abstract

The variety of symptoms associated with schizophrenia are not easily unified under one coherent concept. Nevertheless, under the gaze of phenomenology, a disturbance of pre-reflexive experience has become increasingly apparent as the basis of the condition, which has so far been understood in two different ways: on the one hand, as a disturbance of basal self-experience, of my-ness or ipseity (Louis Sass, Josef Parnas, Dan Zahavi) and on the other hand, as a disturbance of the passive synthesis of inner time consciousness (Aaron Mishara, Shaun Gallagher, Thomas Fuchs). The present work introduces a link between the two approaches by regarding the basal self-experience grounded in an inner time consciousness. Schizophrenia is thus described as a disturbance of the temporal constitution of self-experience, which on the one hand causes self-alienation and on the other impairs the pre-reflexive, embodied performance of thinking, perceiving and moving. These analyses are then applied to the social dimension of the disorder, which manifests itself, among other symptoms, in the loss of spontaneous attunement with others.