Abstract
On March 24, 1976, the Argentine republic experienced another democratically unscheduled transmission of power from civilians to the military. The main excuse for the coup that toppled the second Peronist government was the poor state of the economy-in particular, the alleged runaway that followed the elimination of price ceilings by Economics Minister Celestino Rodrigo in June 1975, an episode that was to be known as el Rodrigazo. The rate of of consumer prices for the year 1975 had been around 180%; ironically, when the inflation busters bowed out in 1983, the rate of was more than 300% (see table 1). In the interim, however, there were some hopeful signs: as can be seen in table 1, steadily fell during 1976-80. This is the period of Economics Minister Jos6 Alfredo Martinez de Hoz.' This, unfortunately, did not last. With fateful symmetry, the rate restarted its upward climb, leaving its wake littered with military presidents (Viola, Galtieri, Bignone), ministers of economics (Sigaut, Alemann, Dagnino Pastore, Wehbe), ... and a war. In this paper I will attempt a reexamination of the de Hoz period. I find it interesting because some of its central policies (e.g., movement toward freer markets and relatively clear monetary targets) represent a radical departure from practices that prevailed in Argentina since World War II, and also because the impact of these policies seems to have extended far beyond the tenure of Martinez de Hoz as minister of economics .2
Published Version
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