Abstract
Cyber-physical threats as false data injection attacks (FDIAs) in islanded smart microgrids (ISMGs) are typical accretion attacks, which need urgent consideration. In this regard, this paper proposes a novel cyber-attack detection model to detect FDIAs based on singular value decomposition (SVD) and fast Fourier transform (FFT). Since new research are mostly focusing on FDIAs detection in DC systems, paying attention to AC systems attack detection is also necessary; hence, AC state estimation (SE) have been used in SI analysis and in considering renewable energy sources effect. Whenever malicious data are added into the system state vectors, vectors’ temporal and spatial datum relations might drift from usual operating conditions. In this approach, switching surface based on sliding mode controllers is dialyzed to regulate detailed FFT’s coefficients to calculate singular values. Indexes are determined according to the composition of FFT and SVD in voltage/current switching surface to distinguish the potential cyber-attack. This protection layout is presented for cyber-attack detection and is studied in various types of FDIA forms like amplitude and vector derivation of signals, which exchanged between agents such as smart sensor, control units, smart loads, etc. The prominent advantage of the proposed detection layout is to reduce the time (less than 10 milliseconds from the attack outset) in several kinds of case studies. The proposed method can detect more than 96% accuracy from 2967 sample tests. The performances of the method are carried out on AC-ISMG in MATLAB/Simulink environment.
Highlights
To examine the efficiency of the suggested attack detection approach for an AC-islanded smart microgrids (ISMGs), various false data injection attacks (FDIAs) has been investigated, and communication links are used to identify the affected node so that security measures can be taken
The information of the local controllers, sensors, communication links and central control agents could be accessed by the attacker in the FDIAs; for simulating the FDIAs, it can be considered that the information is able to be manipulated by the attackers
While lots of work toward attacks and detections has been studied and investigated in DC model, rare research has concentrated on the AC peer, where numerous are accepted by ISMG
Summary
With the increasing growth and compilation of using information and communication technologies (ICTs), many parts of electrical power grids (EPGs) are gently becoming smart and in this regard, concepts of Smart-grids (SGs) and islanded smart microgrids (ISMGs) have emerged [1]. Using smart power systems including state estimation (SE), has a majority of challenges in cyber or physical layers such as cyber-attack and malicious data injection because of dependency on information and telecommunication technologies. One prominent concern can be cyber or physical attacks in these systems [2,3]. Attackers in electrical power networks are able to alter variables by attack to metering devices or by compromising communication infrastructures [4]. Compromised system states might disrupt electrical power network performance, resulting in physical or economic damages on the energy system.
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