Foundations of relativism by J. Margolis in the polemic of R. Rorty and H. Putnam

Abstract

The polemic about the realism of H. Putnam and R. Rorty is a remarkable event of the 20th century for a number of reasons. Forming within the analytical philosophy, and using the most relevant concepts and ideas of this direction as arguments, this polemic for almost three decades of its existence balanced on the border with relativism, the least popular and admited direction of philosophy of the 20th century. Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism reject any "point of view of God", entail "internalism", accept the concept of incommensurability of conceptual schemes and the relativization the reality described by the epistemic agent to his experience. Rorty's arguments reject not only relativism, but also realism, but his concepts of ethnocentrism and solidarity also take the view that the standards of truth correlate with the conceptual schemes, are "sociologized" and meet the interests of the majority. J. Margolis find in this polemic not only a retreat into relativism, but also recognized its pragmatistic potential, which gave him the opportunity to defend relativism, proposing its reliable (robust) version and building a neo-pragmatist philosophy on the development of the arguments of both sides.