Foundations of experiential knowledge: recovering a forgotten resource for social work

Abstract

This article explores the conceptual and theoretical foundation of experiential knowledge. A scoping review shows that limited studies have so far been published about experiential knowledge in the context of social work. Although the value of personal experiences is commonly acknowledged, these are generally not considered ‘real knowledge’. Two main problems are identified, the first being that in dominant positivist scientific conceptions, experiential knowledge is not seen as scientifically relevant. The second is that, epistemologically, it seems problematic to turn personal experiences into collective knowledge. Regarding the first issue, it is argued that from a social-constructivist angle, experiential knowledge is valid knowledge. Not only can denying the value of knowledge based on lived experiences be considered an epistemic injustice, but it also ignores it as a valuable resource for professional education and practice. The second issue needs to be further explored considering the complex processes of experiential knowledge production, using the opportunities that narrative and participative social work research methods offer.