Abstract
The article discusses the reasons why modern formal semantics of natural language is an integral part of a larger philosophical research program for the study of the nature of intentionality. The purpose of this article is to show how research in the field of formal semantics of natural language became the implementation of a large philosophical research program that is focused on the nature of intentional objects, which since the time of F. Brentano have been considered an integral part of mental phenomena. Mental phenomena are opposed to physical phenomena due to their inherent intentionality (being focused on an object). In modern philosophy, it is commonly considered that the comprehension of the nature of intentionality is the key to understanding the nature of consciousness, and, consequently, the nature of man. The article shows that formal semantics represents the structure of the meaning of linguistic expressions, with the help of which human thought is formed, which is one of the main objects of intentional consciousness. In formal semantics, this representation is carried out in a rigorous, systematic, and empirically verifiable way on the basis of natural languages, that is, on those symbolic systems that real people use in real practice to shape their thoughts. The research is based on the works of G. Frege, who laid the foundation for the formal-semantic methodology. Thus, the answer is given to the question of why modern formal linguistics, which originates in the analytical philosophy of the 20th century, is a philosophically significant discipline. This response is a reaction to the objections of skeptics who believe that modern analytic philosophy cannot be considered a direction that has any serious philosophical significance.
Highlights
The article discusses the reasons why modern formal semantics of natural language is an integral part of a larger philosophical research program for the study of the nature of intentionality
The purpose of this article is to show how research in the field of formal semantics of natural language became the implementation of a large philosophical research program that is focused on the nature of intentional objects, which since the time of F
It is commonly considered that the comprehension of the nature of intentionality is the key to understanding the nature of consciousness, and, the nature of man
Summary
Аннотация В статье излагаются причины, по которым современная формальная семантика естественного языка представляет собой неотъемлемую часть более масштабной философской исследовательской программы по изучению природы интенциональности. Цель данной статьи в том, чтобы показать, каким образом исследования в области формальной семантики естественного языка стали реализацией большой философской исследовательской программы, а именно способом изучения природы интенциональных объектов, которые со времен Ф. В современной философии распространена позиция, согласно которой понимание природы интенциональности является ключом к пониманию природы сознания, а следовательно, и природы человека. В статье показано, что формальная семантика представляет структуру смысла языковых выражений, с помощью которой оформляется человеческая мысль, являющаяся одним из главных объектов интенционального сознания. Этот ответ является реакцией на возражения скептиков, считающих, что современная аналитическая философия не может считаться направлением, имеющим какую-либо серьезную философскую значимость.
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