FOREIGN PÓLICY OF POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN: EXPEDIENCY AT THE CROSSROAD OF SUPRA-NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY

«М’ЯКА СИЛА» ЯК ХАРАКТЕРНА ОЗНАКА ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ВПЛИВУ ВЕЛИКОЇ ДЕРЖАВИ ЗАУМОВ БАГАТОПОЛЯРНОГО СВІТУ В ЛАТИНОАМЕРИКАНСЬКОМУ РЕГІОНІ

Purpose – This paper aims to study the impact of the domestic environment’s components in changing foreign policy. Therefore, the paper focuses on analyzing Russia’s strategies, in the International arena, that has been structured by the domestic factors (leadership, military, security, economics, and identity).
 
 Design/methodology/approach – The paper follows three theories of studying the impact of domestic components into foreign policy in international relations; First it focuses on Foreign Policy Analysis as a traditional analysis in international relations; depending on “Determinants” influencing the foreign policy and the “Instruments/Tools” used to achieve the goals of foreign policy. Second, Neo-Classical Realism Theory, as it tried to explain the importance of internal factors in the foreign policy. Third, Constructivism Theory in International Relations as it concerns Non-state actors and refused the traditional viewing of main concepts in international relations.
 
 Findings – The domestic environment is the background context on which foreign policy is drawn. In general, the domestic environment is within the framework of society; according to it the decision-makers make decisions and include domestic policies (public opinion, geographical location, nature of the political system, main values of society, parties, lobbies…etc.); national expertise can be added in dealing with international political issues.
 
 Originality/Value – This paper proves that there are new forms for foreign policy variables related to the domestic environment and reflects the Economic capabilities, Military Power, Identity, and Leadership into the state's foreign policy.

On March 19, 2011, an international ‘coalition of the willing’ embarked on a military intervention in Libya. The aim of the intervention was to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 calling for the use of ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas from attack. The coalition imposed a no-fly zone over northern Libya and stroke against armoured units as well as Libyan air defence systems. On March 31, 2011, NATO took full command of operations. All five Nordic countries supported the intervention against the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi and his government. However, their very different ways of showing their support are illustrative of the different security policies of the Nordic countries in the current world order.2 Denmark quickly deployed six F-16 fighters and one Hercules transport plane along with corresponding ground crews. As one of the most active and efficient participants in the coalition Denmark dropped more than 500 bombs. Norway also deployed six F-16 fighters with corresponding ground crews, and, tied with Denmark, Norway was recognized as the country bombing the most targets when taking into account the number of planes deployed. However, Norway withdrew its aircraft by the end of July, three months before the official end of NATO operations on October 31, after reducing the number of fighters from six to four in June. Sweden, despite not being a NATO member, sent eight JAS 39 Gripen aircrafts, but did not participate in ground attacks. Finland did not contribute militarily, and neither did Iceland for the obvious reason that it has no air force. However, Finland and Iceland – like Denmark, Norway and Sweden – condemned the actions of the Libyan government. The different positions of the five Nordic countries in the Libyan War illustrate five points about their current security policies. First, all Nordic countries are generally supportive of the current liberal world order based on values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights. Second, the willingness of the Nordic countries to support these values with military means varies along a continuum with Denmark at one end and Finland at the other. Third, the ability of the Nordic states to support these values with military means variesalong a continuum with Denmark at one end and Iceland at the other. Fourth, all Nordic countries engage in debates on international security, even when they have no direct national interests in the issues discussed, i.e. they participate in debates over the global order and how to uphold its norms and enforce its rules and regulations. Fifth, all Nordic countries are small European states facing the same dilemmas on when, how and why to engage in these issues of global order and indirect threat, but with marginally different cost-benefit analyses due to their different geopolitical locations and institutional affiliations. The Nordic position in international relations has shifted dramatically over the past century. Although the Nordics today pride themselves on internationalism and global engagement, the peripheral geopolitical position and limited military capabilities of the Nordic countries left them in the periphery of international relations during the creation and expansion of the modern European state system from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War in 1945. During the Cold War, the Nordic states were often seen as constituting a particular Nordic bloc advocating human rights, East-West detente and North-South equality, and arguing the importance of a so-called ‘Nordic Balance’ allowing considerable freedom of action for Nordic states vis-a-vis the two superpowers. After the Cold War, the Nordic states have pursued very different agendas in their security policies. This chapter aims to identify the most important similarities and differences in the security policies of the Nordic states and to explain why the Nordic birds of a feather are no longer flocking together. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, I discuss the Nordic security community and the Nordic model in international relations. They are often viewed as two closely related unique Nordic contributions to international relations and in order to understand the Nordic states in the unipolar order, we need to understand how important concepts such as the Nordic security community and the Nordic model influenced Nordic security policies and helped shape Nordic perceptions of international relations in the recent past. Second, I argue that while the end of the Cold War and the rise of the unipolar world order initially involved a loss of identity in international relations, the Nordic states quickly adopted to the new security order for one simple reason: they were already well integrated to the US sphere of influence. However, the specific strategies that each of them chose differs in important respects from the others. Finally, I assess the prospects for Nordic security in a post-unipolar security order.

Introduction. In the context of growing anti-Russian information wars, intensive and sharp ideological confrontation active information support of Russia’s foreign policy becomes more and more crucial. Methods. Authors use mainly the methods of expert evaluation and trends, opinion polls to prove that the US has long been waging information wars against Russia first using the term (“information war”) back in 1992. Moreover, with time the United States makes the methods of struggle more and more sophisticated and has already attracted the EU and NATO as associates. In addition, the methods of comparative analysis of research results of leading domestic and foreign experts in the field of information and ideological component of modern international relations and issues of information support of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, as well as general scientific and special methods of knowledge of legal phenomena and processes made as the object of the research: the method of systematic and structural analysis, comparative legal and formal-logical methods have been used. Analysis. Along with the tools of public diplomacy our state takes all the needed measures to defend its information sovereignty at all levels. Despite the fact that the Russian state strategy has consistently created a system of detecting, preventing and eliminating threats to its information security, still it is necessary to deal with ever growing amount of antiRussian false information in the global media space. Results. Being one of the instruments of public diplomacy and foreign policy of any sovereign state, soft power takes into account the objective conditions of international relations and world politics and proceeds from the requirements of the national interests of the state as the main actor of the entire system of modern international relations. In the world practice of implementing the policy of soft power, starting with the creation of the Westphalian system of international relations, there was no precedent, when the state regardless of the socio-political nature of building a political system or the purposes of the foreign activity would be guided by different objectives and methods of analysis of world politics, the entire system of international relations and other goal-setting action in the international arena, including defined in the last decade by the concept of soft power. In the history of international relations, there has not been any world policy free from its ideological component. The thesis of de-ideologization of international relations, which received its definite distribution in the period immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the practice of foreign policy actions of all the main actors of modern world politics has clearly proved its complete failure. Today, in the context of “hybrid wars” within the entire system of international relations, the world politics is no less ideologized than during the “cold war”. The political leadership of Russia allows the hypothetical possibility of cyberwarfare, provoked by the actions of the Republican administration of the United States. In December 2019, the White House authorized the preparation of a plan for conducting an information war with the Russian Federation by special forces of the U.S. Army, assigning the solution of this task to the above-mentioned cyber command. The policy of soft power of Russia, as well as its public diplomacy, as the whole complex of foreign policy activities of the Russian Federation in the international arena, is derived from the fundamental function of defending the national interests of Russia in the new political reality. The Russian Federation has consistently opposed the transformation of international relations into an arena of ideological confrontation with the use of tools of the so-called “information wars”. State sovereignty is unified. Information security, as a factor of ensuring information sovereignty, is a basic component of the unified state sovereignty. This is an accepted truth underlying the understanding of the nature of modern international relations, the principle underlying the foreign policy activity of any modern sovereign state, due to the objective regularity of the growth of the ideological factor of modern international relations. Moreover, in the face of targeted misinformation Russia needs to ensure its information security at both levels: political (ideological) and technical (technological) ones combining cyber as well as soft power tools. Only such a combination of these two crucial elements and continuous improvement can lead to victory in hybrid wars.

India is a rapidly growing democratic naval power. Moreover, its features such as the strong and fast-growing economy, newest military technologies and nuclear weapon make a big impression. Considering the other major powers, it seems that the world is becoming multipolar where India could have a significant role and become one of the major poles. It has been a subject for discussions among journalists and academics for a log time. On the other hand, there are a lot of discussions about India’s “friendly and mild” foreign policy; also, it is sometimes named the non-ambitious passive player in the international arena. The optimism with doubts: the paradoxical situation composed of the history of the impressive imperial civilization, modern-day economic growth, huge progress in technologies versus the major internal problems and “soft” state image. Here emerges the problem: why India’s foreign policy, despite its power growth, is still passive/neutral on the international arena? The hypotheses to answering this question are: 1. India’s role and status are restricted by its lack of power. 2. India’s role on the international arena is restricted by its ideological and neutrality traditions, which provide ontological security to India. The aim of this article is to ascertain and explore India’s status (regional or global) and to ascertain India’s role (self-identification) on the international arena by using the ontological security theory.The theoretical background of this essay is ontological security theory which ten years ago was absorbed from sociology and is quite new in the international relations and security studies. Its main arguments are: ontological security is the security of being; in addition to physical security, states also seek ontological security (security of the self); ontological security is achieved by routinizing relationships with significant others, after all players become attached to those relationships, even if they are dangerous to their physical security. This theory is strongly bound with the identity that India always gives the self culture prominence in its discourse and its friendly discourse in the Ministry of Defence annual reports. This is the reason why the ontological security theory was chosen to help understand and explain India’s foreign policy. First, links between ontological and traditional security are discussed in the first part of this work. There is a broad analysis of the assumptions of the ontological security theory in the same paragraph. Second, there is a short criticism of the ontological security. Finally, the ontological security theory as the India’s foreign policy explanation tool is discussed; the discourse analysis is introduced as a methodological instrument of the work, and the model of analysis of the second part of the work, is defined. The second part of the work contains the content analysis of experts’ articles and official documents of India’s Foreign Ministry, using the model defined in the previous part and ontological security for the results’ explanation.The analysis made in the second part of the work has shown that the ontological security theory is able to explain India’s foreign policy and does it. The first hypothesis (India’s role and status are restricted by its lack of power) was denied. This means that India can be a major global power. The second hypothesis (India’s role in the international arena is restricted by its ideological and neutrality traditions, which provide ontological security to India) was approved. Strictly, it means that India does not want to be a major power because of it self-identity and ontological security. India does not expose itself as a major power but thinks that is worth to be such. On the other hand, if India has absorbed the international politics routine form the British Empire, this could mean that India’s identity is to be a global power, but it does not want to publicise it yet.The study has shown that it is hard to regard India in the international community as a major power without special observation or using just the realism theory tools. Consequently, the ontological security theory has shown that it has the tools that can be used in countries’ foreign policy explanation.

After the end of Second World War, the two power bloc was raising in world politics and the revelry between the blocs was on top. The Cold War politics emerged as a bitter experience of international relations. Both blocs were mollifying the other countries of the world. It had to become stronger because of many newly independent countries. For the sake their independence many countries choose the third path to avoiding war and keeping their independence, they framed NAM (Non-alignment Movement). Most of these countries was belong to Asia and Africa and also newly independent. The US (United States) and European countries criticized NAM and revoked it as a group of opportunist countries. The NAM emerged as an international platform as a third alternative of two power blocs. The NAM was the international phenomenon of developing and third world countries. Non-alignment grew out of the cold war bitter relationship between US and USSR. Some developing and third world newly independent countries refused to post Second World War world politics through the eyes of their erstwhile colonial rulers. Indian Prime Minister Nehru was one of the paramount leaders of NAM since its inception. After the demise of British rule in India, India also refused to join any bloc in Cold War time. Nehru did not want to enter in two bloc politics due to India’s national interests. He thought that Indian independence could diminish if India going toward any blocs and adopted Non-alignment as an instrument of foreign policy. He also made effort to discuss other world leader to formulate NAM as platform of collective voice of newly independence countries. The paper also aims to explain India’s contribution to the Non-alignment Movement.
 The first formal conference of NAM was in Bandung in 1961. Nehru and others NAM leaders uttered against new imperialism in Asia and Africa in Bandung Summit by the western countries. Some countries raise questions about the importance and relevance of NAM and produce it as a callous movement after the end of the Cold War. However the broader membership of NAM proved its relevance and importance. Most of the world countries adopted NAM membership due to its popularity and momentous agenda. While the Cold War strategic environment underestimates Non-alignment movement and the two power blocs tried to demoralize Non-alignment movement, however the Non-alignment movement was accomplishing their work with a greater momentum.
 Non-alignment, both as a foreign policy perspective of most newly independence states of Asia, Africa and Latin America and as well as an international movement was a critical factor of contemporary international relations. The Non-alignment movement was the collective voice of developing and third world countries since the first official meeting of its leaders in Belgrade in 1961. The policy of the Non-alignment has been being the issue of debate in international politics since its origin. In 1970’s, its importance and relevance had questioned, with the emergence of détente in international relations. The US and European countries did not consider the NAM movement at that time. Both power blocs were also questioned the role of NAM in cold war era. The western countries always tagged NAM as a collaboration of opportunist countries. It was such a big thing that NAM survived in fracas of cold war. The study tried to remove skepticism on Non-alignment and NAM in post-Cold War arena. It is also suggesting a new way for making the movement effective and relevant in present context.

This research paper explores after independence Uzbekistan what kind of innovations did under 2 president’s control, focusing on the foreign countries how and what kind of contracts did in 30 years. Under Islam Karimov’s control overall policy and strategic relations developed radically. Under Mirziyoyev’s control foreign policy and international relations strengthened and controlled much more open with education and programs. The achievement of independence by each country opens a new page in its history. For Uzbekistan 1991 year of openness to the world, this day changed everybody's life in a different way and opened new opportunities for the country. In the early years of independence, caution was the priority in the country's foreign policy, and ensuring internal stability was the main goal. Under the leadership of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan began to find its place in the international community, established diplomatic relations with countries around the world, and joined international organizations. During Karimov's time, Uzbekistan became a member of the UN and other international organizations, established diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and opened the way for foreign trips and international economic cooperation. Later, a cautious foreign policy was pursued, prioritizing internal stability. Since 2016, under the leadership of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the foreign policy vector has fundamentally changed, borders have been opened, and historic steps have been taken to restore an atmosphere of trust with neighboring countries. Regional integration, diplomatic activity, and multi-vector cooperation have increased Uzbekistan's prestige in the international arena and created new opportunities for economic and political development. During the years of independence, Uzbekistan independently formed its foreign policy, setting national interests as a priority. During this period, the country expanded international relations on the basis of strategic cooperation and paid attention to economic and cultural integration. In the field of tourism, a country that had been closed for many years, the simplification of the visa procedure, the increase in the number of international flights and the creation of the "Silk Road" tourism corridors not only increased the flow of tourists, but also strengthened regional cooperation. This developed as an important part of foreign policy and served to form a positive image of Uzbekistan in the international arena. The concept of "soft power" was put into practice through the cultural heritage monuments of historical cities such as Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva. Thus, during the years of independence, Uzbekistan took a step from strategic cooperation to regional leadership in foreign policy.

In recent years, the rapid development and differentiation of the international community has become not only a driver of progress, but also a cause of imbalance in power, as the foreign policy identity of a state depends not only on the chosen vectors of foreign policy, but also on the correlation between the views of political elites and society. The purpose of this study was to analyse the scientific literature for the coverage of the problems related to the legal principles on which the foreign policy identity of states in international relations is based. The methodological framework of this study included the heuristic method, methods of analysis and synthesis, methods of generalisation and abstraction. The study found that in modern research, the foreign policy identity of a sovereign state in the international arena is understood in the context of its dependence on the specific features of political processes within the state, as well as on the cultural identification of its ethnic group. These categories are the hallmarks of a state’s identity in international politics and ensure the stability of its perception by other actors in international relations. One of the crucial tasks for the establishment and preservation of the foreign policy identity of the state is to reduce the pressure of political elites on the relations between the state and the people, as well as to ensure that the population of the state supports its foreign policy course in the international arena. Today, Ukraine lacks mechanisms to help eliminate such negative political influences, and therefore a system of cause-and-effect relationships was created to transform the priorities of sustainable development of the state’s activities in this area. The practical significance of this study is that recommendations were developed to create conditions and eliminate internal and external threats in the field of international relations to ensure foreign policy identity with the possibility of their further application in the foreign policy of the state

The article reflects the results of the study of the history of the formation of foreign and security policy of the European Community at the stage of functioning of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism. The prerequisites for the formation of the foreign policy mechanism of interaction between the EEC member states are shown. The formation of political conditions and institutional and functional dimensions of the EPC is analyzed. The main international problems that had to be solved by the participants of European integration through the EPC mechanism are highlighted. The author takes into account the specifics of this segment of cooperation of the European Community States, which for a long time did not have an official status and was in fact experimental. The author points out the defining contradictions and controversial issues of the development of the foreign policy segment of the European Community in the context of the maturation of transformations in the system of international relations and world security in the second half of the 1980s. The study concludes that the establishment of the EPC format meant only the beginning of a complex process of formation of a full-fledged subjectivity of the European Community in the international arena. The period from 1970 (formal creation of the EPC mechanism) to 1986 (adoption of the Single European Act) can be interpreted as the initial period in the history of the formation of the European Community’s foreign and security policies. In general, the usual weakness of the mechanism for coordinating the foreign policy of the EEC states was manifested due to the diversity of their international interests and, most importantly, the lack of effective means of implementing common positions. However, this does not diminish the historical significance of this period. After all, at that time the Community formed the principles and basic approaches to its political organization and activities in the international arena. Also, its leadership learned to respond as quickly as possible to the challenges of world politics and form its policy in different regions of the world, diplomatic representation, and international image. The result of these changes provided invaluable experience for the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The inclusion of foreign and security policy in the regulatory framework of the EEC in the Single European Act of 1986 meant only the beginning of a complex process of forming a full-fledged subjectivity of the European Community in the international arena.

This chapter (in Spanish) seeks to locate human rights in the broader tradition and trends of Brazilian foreign policy. In short, the chapter argues that since the transition to democracy Brazil’s foreign policy has gradually shifted from a traditional pluralist position on international human rights (emphasising the centrality of state sovereignty in international relations) , to broadly accepting the legitimacy of the international human rights regime, as well as accepting international scrutiny of its domestic human rights record. Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been dominated by the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) that tended to view international human rights suspiciously as a cloak for foreign intervention in domestic affairs. However, as Brazilian foreign policy has democratized – with increasing civil society input – and as Brazil has emerged as a pivotal player in global governance, the engagement with international human rights by Brazilian foreign policy has increased. This shift has created the necessary policy conditions for a more active Brazilian role in the international human rights regime on the one hand, and a more prominent role for human rights in Brazilian foreign policy more generally, on the other. Yet, Brazil’s foreign policy in the area of human rights remains uneven, raising fundamental questions regarding the future role of Brazil in the international human rights regime. This is due to a combination of internal and external factors, including: a fragile domestic social order with continuing human rights violations; a foreign policy process that tends to privilege narrow conceptions of national interest; and continuing uncertainty over the role of emerging states in the international human rights regime. These uncertainties notwithstanding, the rise of Brazil in international relations has generated increasing expectations on Brazil to play a prominent role on the international arena, including with regards to the international human rights regime. It remains unclear, however, how Brazilian foreign policy will respond to these expectations. Although Brazil has become increasingly embedded in the international human rights regime, Brazilian foreign policy on human rights remains uneven and ambivalent. The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section briefly reviews the explanations for why a country would (and should) adopt human rights as objectives for its foreign policies. The second section maps Brazil’s increasing engagement with the international human rights regime since the transition to democracy and up until the end of the Cardoso government in 2002. The third section assesses the extent to which human rights influence Brazil’s formulation and pursuit of foreign policy objectives while situating human rights in the broader context of Brazil’s foreign policy process during the Lula administrations (2003-2010). The concluding section seeks to evaluate the importance of human rights concerns for Brazilian foreign policy. It also provides some tentative reflections on present and future trends in Brazilian foreign policy with regards to human rights.

Norm Contestation and Global Governance: Taking Actor Configurations and Practical Reasoning Seriously

The article reveals the significance of the usage of France’s nuclear status as a tool for the realisation of its foreign policy interests in the International Arena, especially in the context of necessity to ensure its security. A well-formulated and scientifically grounded, clear and reasonably transparent strategy for Foreign Policy ensures state security and is an inalienable attribute of a civilised, contemporary International Actor. One of the most critical aspects of France’s Defence strategy is based on its nuclear status. Therefore, it is essential to understand its role and function in the formulation of the foreign policy strategy. In particular, the concept of «nuclear diplomacy» is explored on the example of the French Republic. This concept describes the possibility of using nuclear status in various fields of foreign policy to achieve the interests of the state in the world arena. The survey describes political, economic and security aspects of the disposition of nuclear diplomacy in foreign policy. Also, the historical experience of exercising the nuclear status as a tool has been analysed. Relying on the analysis made it has been found that the practice of using nuclear status as a tool for conducting international dialogue has its several advantages, the main of which is the efficient protection of the national interests of the state. The author emphasises the fact that the wise usage of all nuclear status benefits, in the present conditions of growing instability and turbulence in international relations is a vital requirement for the development of France, especially as for nuclear-weapon state and a significant actor in the international arena. It has been argued that the nuclear status is inextricably associated not only with the formation of a state security strategy but also with the development of the image and geopolitical component of security, aimed at providing the necessary conditions for the realisation of French national interests in the International Arena, as one of the most effective methods of guaranteeing security and independence in the modern world. The modern world is the world of pervasive transformations and breakthroughs connected with the degeneration of traditional and modern structures. Although today the world is interconnected and united more than ever before, it is necessary to respect and estimate the idea of boundaries, sovereignty, and independence of a state, the right of a state to lead its policy. So, the best guarantee of directing separate political line it is wise using of one of the most effective and impressive tools, in a Foreign Policy too, that is nuclear status.

<p>This thesis is an in-depth study into the New Zealand-Australian relationship and the two nations' divergence in International Relations, with particular reference to the disparate foreign and security policies implemented under the Howard and Clark Governments from 1996/1999 respectively until the present time in 2007. The purpose of this study is to provide an accurate and up-to-date overview of the New Zealand-Australian relationship as it stands today, and to define the main areas of difference between the two countries which are driving trans-Tasman divergence in the international sphere. In pursuit of this goal, the subject-area is explored in the following ways. Chapter One provides a general overview of the trans-Tasman relationship, reflecting specifically on three abiding dynamics which together have contributed to the 'strangeness' of the trans-Tasman rapport from the mid-1800s until today. Chapter Two, defines in fuller detail the greatest areas of divergence between the two countries in their foreign and security policies, and then additionally outlines three important issues in the international sphere on which the Tasman pair have diverged most strikingly in recent years. Chapters Three to Five explore three areas of fundamental difference between the Tasman pair in their International Relations, considered here to be driving factors behind the trans-Tasman divide - namely, different beliefs and approaches towards multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States. Finally, Chapters Six and Seven explore three contemporary theories attempting to explain New Zealand and Australia's divergence in International Relations today. There are three main arguments throughout this thesis: first, that New Zealand and Australia are becoming increasingly divergent in their foreign affairs; second, that this divergence is primarily due to the fact that the two countries are fundamentally different in their views and approaches towards three crucial areas within international politics - multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States; and thirdly, that these differences in view and approach, and the divergent policies they produce, in turn arise chiefly from completely disparate senses of national identity in the two Tasman countries, which motivate differing - and sometimes conflicting - foreign policy behaviour. These three arguments are explored and expounded in the following ways. With regard to the first argument, Chapter Two provides an in-depth overview of the most important areas of divergence between New Zealand and Australia since 1999. As to the second argument, Chapters Three to Five employ a case study based on discourse analysis into New Zealand and Australian governmental speeches on the 2002-2003 Iraq Crisis - an issue that inherently involved these three fundamental areas of difference - in order to specify how precisely New Zealand and Australia diverge in their view and approach to these three matters based on the two Governments' own self-proffered statements and explanations. These disparate beliefs are then shown to translate into divergent actions and foreign policy behaviour on the world stage, by substantiating such rhetorical statements with evidence taken from the Howard and Clark Governments' foreign policy record, as documented in governmental documents as well as in political and academic literature. Finally, with regard to third argument, Chapters Six and Seven involve a discussion and critique of two rather convincing orthodox explanations for trans-Tasman divergence, Hugh White's 'Strategic Perception' and David McCraw's 'Divergent Political Ideologies', as well as a summary and broad application of one new theoretical explanation called 'Identity Theory' to New Zealand and Australia's foreign policy record, in order to show that it is indeed identity-based explanations, when combined with other strategic and political factors, that in fact provide the most accurate, comprehensive and insightful explanation for New Zealand and Australia's divergent behaviour in the international sphere from the time of Federation in 1901 until today in 2007. This thesis makes the following conclusions: first, that it is fundamentally different beliefs in regard to multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States which are driving the 'continental drift' between New Zealand and Australia, through motivating disparate policies and conflicting behaviour by the Tasman pair in their international affairs, as shown during the 2003 Iraq Crisis; secondly, that these dissimilar beliefs regarding the three matters stem in turn from deeply-rooted foreign policy traditions within New Zealand and Australia's own core national identity, namely traditions of independence, idealism and multilateralism in New Zealand, and independence, realism and alliances in Australia; and thirdly, that it is in fact national identity - encompassing national beliefs, traditions and ideas of what the nation stands for and is destined to become - that can best explain nation-state behaviour and action on the world stage today. In my own view, I believe that it is identity theory, when combined with aspects of disparate strategic perception and predominant governmental political ideology advocated by White and McCraw, which together present the best and most wide-ranging means of understanding the complex realities of International Relations today. It is hoped that the research undertaken in this thesis will not only contribute to the new wave of academic literature attempting to describe and explain the differences between New Zealand and Australia in our foreign affairs today in 2007, but also add to the growing consensus in the constructvist academic world that identity-based explanations are crucial for understanding foreign affairs.</p>

The article explores the possibility of strengthening and expanding the British political and military presence in the Indian Ocean, its probable goals, objectives, methods and means there. The main purpose of the study is to consider the possibility activating the British military policy in this area, to assess the importance of the Indian Ocean region for London, the prospect of direct expansion of the military presence, the role of British private military companies and alternative methods of influence. The paper analyzes current trends and problems in the foreign and security policy of the United Kingdom. The relevance of the study is due to the change in the British architecture of foreign policy and the perception of its place in international relations. Using system and comparative analysis methods of research, the author concludes the growing probability of expanding the British military presence in the Indian Ocean in the medium and long term. Modern British navy firearms status can allow to increase the intensity of the British military presence in the Indian Ocean. Also, this circumstance may activate Great Britain’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region. It should be noted that the strengthening of the British fleet can be called a marker of the desire of the United Kingdom to become a global player in the international arena. To achieve this goal, almost all possible means of strengthening the capabilities of the UK’s hard power are used: the navy, private military companies, as well as new military alliances such as AUKUS. The work on intensifying the influence in the Indo-Pacific region is a part of the British foreign policy on global strengthening, and should be considered in the context of other regions: Ukraine, Turkey and Northern Europe. Nevertheless, at the moment, the results of such activities cannot be called completely predictable.

China's political philosophy has its own identity and intellectual tradition. In the science of international relations, China's national developments in the field of theory are gaining popularity. The schools of theories of the People's Republic of China combine traditional national developments with classical theoretical approaches. At the same time, there is a relationship between the growth of China in the international arena and interest in Chinese theories. The author analyzes the main schools of theories of China's international relations. When analyzing theories, the author uses a retrospective approach and compares the main stages of the development of theories with important historical events in the foreign and domestic policy of the People's Republic of China. The author examines the relationship between the dominance of various theoretical approaches of international relations and the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. The author analyzes the Chinese experience of building national schools of theories of international relations, evaluates theoretical approaches in the context of foreign policy events. The author analyzes the current state of the national school of the theory of international relations in China and the scientific discourse on the assessment of its content in the political science community. The author reveals a pattern between the foreign policy course of the state and research in the field of international relations. The article highlights several reasons for emerging of the active scientific discourse that has developed around the national theory of international relations of China. The experience of Chinese researchers can be used to build theories of international relations in Russia.