Flaw and amendment of Dharminder et al.'s authentication protocol for satellite communication

Abstract

SummarySatellite communication is becoming an increasingly important component of the communication process, as all forms of communication are sent over open networks. As a result, there is an increase in the number of security concerns, and several protocols have been established with this consideration in mind. Recently, Dharminder et al. proposed a post‐quantum secure authentication protocol for satellite communication. The protocol is an improved version of Kumar and Garg's protocol. The authors claimed that the protocol resists the vulnerability of Kumar and Garg's protocol and provides post‐quantum security for satellite communication. Despite their claims, we have found that the protocol is vulnerable to a key mismatch attack and an offline dictionary attack. Further, we have improved Dharminder et al.'s proposed protocol that resists the key mismatch attack and offline dictionary attack and have provided the condition for the correctness of the improved protocol. Our formal security proof and implementation results demonstrate that the improved protocol is secure against quantum attacks.