Fischer-style Compatibilism

Abstract

John Martin Fischer’s new collection of essays, Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, constitutes a trenchant defence of his well-known compatibilist approach to moral responsibility (Fischer 1994, 2006; Fischer and Ravizza 1998).1 Predominantly a collection of detailed responses to recent critics, this is not a book for beginners. It is, however, essential reading for specialists, as well as useful reading for non-specialists seeking a snapshot of the current state of the debate. Fischer’s papers are dense with argument and alive with original and productive ideas. As is customary, however, I here focus only on lines of thought that failed to convince. In particular, I discuss two arguments: one aimed at vindicating Frankfurt-style counterexamples in deterministic contexts and one aimed at undermining the ‘source’ incompatibilist’s conception of moral responsibility.