Abstract
Given a set of agents qualifying or disqualifying each other, group identification is the task of identifying a socially qualified subgroup of agents. Social qualification depends on the specific rule used to aggregate individual qualifications . The classical bribery problem in this context asks how many agents need to change their qualifications in order to change the outcome in a certain way. Complementing previous results showing polynomial-time solvability or NP-hardness of bribery for various social rules in the constructive (aiming at making specific agents socially qualified) or destructive (aiming at making specific agents socially disqualified) setting, we provide a comprehensive picture of the parameterized computational complexity landscape. Conceptually, we also consider a more fine-grained concept of bribery cost, where we ask how many single qualifications need to be changed, nonunit prices for different bribery actions, and a more general bribery goal that combines the constructive and destructive setting.
Published Version (
Free)
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call