Feeling and Freedom: Kant on Aesthetics and Morality

Abstract

In final section of introduction to Critique of Judgment, Kant speaks of gulf' (grosse Kluft) that separates realm of concept of from that of the concept of freedom. The concept of he states, determines nothing in regard to theoretical cognition of nature; concept of nature likewise [determines] nothing in regard to practical laws of freedom. It does not seem possible to throw a bridge across this gulf; he continues, but in fact the faculty of judgment yields mediating concept between concept of nature and concept of freedom, which makes possible transition from purely theoretical to purely practical, from lawfulness of former to final purpose of latter, in concept of a purposiveness of nature. Such a mediating concept apparently must show that even though the determining grounds of causality according to concept of freedom (and practical laws which contains) are not founded in nevertheless their effect, in accord with these formal laws, should take place in world (CJ, Introduction IX, pp. 195-196).' Many writers have offered accounts of how concept of purposiveness of nature, or more broadly formal purposiveness of both aesthetic and teleological judgment, is supposed to bridge gulf between causality of nature according to theoretical laws and causality of freedom according to practical laws. But few pause to ask question, what gulf? What problem about relationship between legislations of nature and freedom remains to be solved in Critique of Judgment that was not already solved by Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason? Had not proof of actuality of freedom in second Critique, building upon proof of its logical and epistemological possibility in third antinomy of first Critique, already solved problem of relation between causality of nature and causality of freedom? Kant's conception of morality as well as model of relations between theoretical and practical reason which he had evolved by time of completion of Critique of Practical Reason, which we might have conveniently called his metaphysics of morals if he had not preempted that title for his detailed description of our actual duties of justice and virtue in his last great work, comprised several key claims. Above all was Kant's conception of virtue or moral worth as a quality attaching to agents on account of their attempts to perform actions intended to comply with moral law solely on ground that such actions are required by moral law, that is, from motive of duty alone: it is not enough to do what is right, but must also be performed solely on ground that is right (CJ, ?53, p. 327). Next, there was a claim about our knowledge of moral law: pure practical reason alone can discover moral law without assistance from any other faculty of cognition. Third, there was a claim about our knowledge of actuality of freedom: although acknowledgment of difference between phenomena and noumena, appearances and things in themselves, and recognition that deduction of universal applicability of law of natural causation holds only for objects of empirical knowledge or appearances had been argued, in solution to third antinomy in first Critique, to suffice for proof of possibility of a causality according to laws of freedom as well as laws of nature, only in second Critique was argued that