Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, edited by Edward L. Gibson. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, 377 pp., $18.95 paperback.

Abstract

Contrary to William Riker's well-known finding that “federalism does not matter,” the contributors to this volume find that it does. Just how it matters is the subject of the ten theoretically driven and empirically rich chapters. But one will not find a one-size-fits-all approach or a unifying theory that explains the variation in federal systems and their effects across the Latin American cases. With the warning that not all the contributors agree and that there is as much variation in the practice of federalism than what one would predict from an assessment of institutional design, Gibson's overview of the volume provides clues to the rich empirical analysis of subsequent chapters. The main theoretical disagreements lie along the question of the causal weight of party system factors and the constitutional particulars of federalism itself. The former appears often as the main exogenous factor, whereas other outcomes rely on differences among federal systems that are either endogenous to federal institutions or the result of particular pathways of political change. Malapportionment and the territoriality of representation stand out as core areas of concern in most of the chapters. But true to a volume that seeks to initiate new research, none offers definitive conclusions regarding the trajectories of Latin American federalism.