Municipal Reform in the Russian Federation and Putin's "Electoral Vertical"

Abstract

Since President Putin came to in 2000 we have witnessed radical assault on principles and practices of federalism. More recently, Putin has turned his attention to politics at subregional level. October 2003 new federal law, On Principles of Local Self Government in Russian (hereafter, 2003 Law), adopted that seriously compromises local government autonomy.1 After discussing major features of 2003 Law and problems of its implementation, this article examines most recent round of municipal elections, which took place in 2004 and 2005. Municipal elections in many federal subjects have been far from free and fair. State control over local electoral commissions and courts have dealt serious blow to development of grassroots democracy in Russia. consolidation of democracy has also been undermined by series of laws on elections and parties that Putin adopted in wake of Beslan hostage crisis in September 2004. These new laws, ostensibly designed to strengthen Russia's party system, have, in practice, allowed United Russia to consolidate its hold over regional and local assemblies.Federalism and Local Government in Russian FederationIn theory, local governments in Russia operate outside formal state hierarchy. Article 12 of Russian Constitution states that, In Russian Federation local self-government is recognized and guaranteed. Within limits of its powers local self-government is independent. Bodies of local self-government do not form part of system of bodies of state power. However, municipalities have, in practice, been treated as third tier of state power, subordinate to regional and federal administrations.2Municipal government in Russia also operates within quasi-federal system epitomized by high levels of constitutional and political asymmetry. Thus, to fully understand local level politics, peculiarities of Russian federal system, and in particular massive powers that were ceded to federal subjects in 1990s need to be taken into account. Between 1994 and 1998 Yeltsin signed forty-six bilateral treaties with federal subjects that granted signatories number of extraconstitutional powers, including right to develop their own forms of local government. By end of Yeltsin era, highly politicized form of contract federalism had replaced constitutional federalism. The result, Campbell stresses, was not decentralisation but 'autonomisation' . . . whereby state held together by loose parade of treaties bargained between centre and individual regions.3Daniel Elazar argues that local governments in federal systems are often able to gain a substantial measure of entrenched political power by capitalizing on the spirit of noncentralisation-the spirit of federalism.4 However, in Russia's quasi-federal system, regional elites have been able to subjugate local level bodies with impunity. many of ethnic republics (e.g., Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Kalmykiya, Komi, North Ossetiya, Sakha, and Tatarstan), chief executives were able to carve out personal fiefdoms and to instigate highly authoritarian regimes. Local governments were subordinated to republican administrations, and republican presidents directly appointed heads of municipalities.5 Moreover, 1995 law, On Principles of Local Self-Government in Russian (hereafter, 1995 Law), not implemented in eighteen regions, and only partially in forty-three.6Thus, on eve of Putin's accession to presidency, there were major variations, across federation, in structures, functions, and powers of local governments. Indeed, degree of political and economic asymmetry at local level even higher than in regions. Regional elites often had final say over which powers would be delegated to municipalities. …