Family violence: A microeconomic approach

Abstract

A model of violence between adult family members is developed by integrating material from the sociological theories of family violence and social exchange, and the economic theories of crime and the family. Based on this model a decrease in the dictator's internal sanctions against violence would be expected to increase the amount of time allocated to violence by the dictator. Further, if the level of fines and other monetary costs imposed by external agencies (e.g., the courts) as a result of the family violence do not vary with the level of violence, then the model indicates that an increase in such monetary sanctions will cause a reduction in the amount of time the dictator allocates to violence. If both the dictator and victim are risk neutral, an increase in the probability of external intervention will decrease the time allocated to violence. In addition, it is found that increases in the opportunities available to the victim outside the marriage will tend to improve the well-being of the victim in the marriage even if it has no effect on the time allocated to violence by the dictator. The model also provides insights for empirical work in family violence such as (1) suggestions of relevant independent variables, (2) the specification of a functional form for estimation, and (3) the specification of an error structure for the empirical model.