Abstract

The main aim of this research is to investigate the influence the institutional environment has on the difference in performance between Italian family firms run by a family member and firms run by a professional manager. By using total factor productivity (TFP) as a measure of performance, we find that family-run firms are less productive than firms run by outside managers when institutional quality is high, but that the results are less obvious when institutional quality is low. The difference in performance is not significant, but by using the level of corruption as a measure of institutional quality, older family firms are found to be more productive than firms run by outside managers. rd of directors and their characteristics. We performed a set of regression analysis to evaluate whether the participation of women in the firm’s board of directors and the presence of connections among boardrooms enhance the financial performance measured through Tobin’s Q and Return On Asset (ROA). Empirical results contribute to extend scientific literature about this topic and to provide interesting practical contributions on the role of gender minority and the connections among companies on firms’ performance. Parallel, this research develops topics related to text mining (that is the automatic extraction of quantitative information from text-documents) referring to all the firms’ disclosures, produced in the Italian language.

Highlights

  • IntroductionA vast quantity of literature has investigated the impact of family influence on firms’ performance (for a survey see Carney, van Essen, Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2015; Chrisman, Kellermanns, Chan, & Liano, 2010; Schulze & Gedajlovich, 2010 amongst others), the empirical evidence is mixed (Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008) and the relationship between family involvement and performance remains controversial

  • A vast quantity of literature has investigated the impact of family influence on firms’ performance, the empirical evidence is mixed (Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008) and the relationship between family involvement and performance remains controversial

  • Besides the potential impact of institutional environment on firm performance, scholars are beginning to recognise that family firms are affected by context (Carney et al, 2015; Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2012; Liu, Yang, & Zhang, 2012; Lumpkin, Steier, & Wright, 2011; Wright, Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2014) and it is surprising to see how the little research that has looked into the issue focuses on family firms in transition economies (Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera, 2012; Amit, Ding, Villalonga, & Zhang, 2015; Banalieva, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2015; Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Breton-Miller, 2009; Peng & Jiang, 2010)

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Summary

Introduction

A vast quantity of literature has investigated the impact of family influence on firms’ performance (for a survey see Carney, van Essen, Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2015; Chrisman, Kellermanns, Chan, & Liano, 2010; Schulze & Gedajlovich, 2010 amongst others), the empirical evidence is mixed (Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008) and the relationship between family involvement and performance remains controversial. A number of studies demonstrate that the relationship between family involvement and firm performance is complex, nonlinear and multifaceted (Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne, 2005; Cucculelli, Mannarino, Pupo, & Ricotta, 2014; Miller, Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007), so suggesting the influence of moderating factors This literature does not, take into account the influence of context on family firm behaviour, many authors have considered the influence of the institutional environment on firms’ productivity (among others, Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008; Chanda & Dalgaard, 2008; Lasagni, Nifo, & Vecchione, 2015; McGuinness, 2007). This research considers the case of a developed economy, Italy, with the aim of investigating the influence of the institutional environment on the difference in performance between firms run by families and firms run by outside managers

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