Abstract

False data injection (FDI) attacks represent a serious threat to securing nuclear reactor operation. Efficient FDI attack detection is essential to prevent related unforeseen nuclear accidents. However, owing to their design principles, the existing detection methods are limited in their ability to detect multiple types of FDI attacks. To address this issue, we propose a detection scheme for FDI attacks on a nuclear reactor based on the chaotic time/frequency-hopping (TH/FH) spread spectrum. The proposed scheme uses frequency hopping modulation, demodulation, and filtering of the signal based on hyper-chaotic sequences to limit the attacker's access to the system's real data and eliminate the adverse effects of attacks on the system. Furthermore, theoretical analysis derives the stability constraint of the frequency hopping frequency and demonstrates the detectability and defendability of the proposed scheme. Experimental simulations demonstrated that our proposed scheme can detect two typical FDI attacks, replay attacks and covert attacks, without compromising system operation, and defend against and reproduce covert attack signals.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.