False Data Injection- and Propagation-Aware Game Theoretical Approach for Microgrids

Abstract

Defending microgrids against cyberattacks has been recognized as a significant task in modern energy systems. This paper studies a False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) scenario targeting microgrids, in which the attacker maliciously propagates false data malware in the communication network of a microgrid system, aiming at misleading the microgrid’s operation. Firstly, this paper establishes the propagation and attack models for the false data malware; then, the impact of the FDIA is quantified through the formulation of a network-constrained microgrid dispatch model. Based on this, a false data malware propagation-aware game between the attacker and the defender is established and an effective computational approach is developed for solving the proposed game and obtaining the potential Nash equilibrium strategy pair. Extensive numerical simulations are conducted to validate the proposed framework.