Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items with Conflict Graphs

Abstract

We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Namely, we introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms of a conflict graph. Every subset of items assigned to one agent has to form an independent set in this graph. Thus, the allocation of items to the agents corresponds to a partial coloring of the conflict graph. Every agent has its own profit valuation for every item. Aiming at a fair allocation, our goal is the maximization of the lowest total profit of items allocated to any one of the agents. The resulting optimization problem contains, as special cases, both Partition and Independent Set. In our contribution we derive complexity and algorithmic results depending on the properties of the given graph. We show that the problem is strongly NP-hard for bipartite graphs and their line graphs, and solvable in pseudo-polynomial time for the classes of chordal graphs, cocomparability graphs, biconvex bipartite graphs, and graphs of bounded treewidth. Each of the pseudo-polynomial algorithms can also be turned into a fully polynomial approximation scheme (FPTAS).