Failure or Façade? Why Ethnic Organizations Strategically Forgo Policing

Abstract

In-group policing is effective at mitigating conflict because ethnic elites have information needed to identify and punish spoilers within their own communities. Yet, ethnic organizations do not always police those who use unsanctioned violence. Under what conditions will an organization forgo its in-group policing responsibility? Relying on the case of Hezbollah, this article argues that in-group policing in patronage-based societies is a strategic choice. Patronage networks induce compliance by tying it to the provision of goods and services, thereby decreasing the likelihood of violations. When individuals utilize unsanctioned violence, leaders must consider the costs of policing relative to three audiences: 1. Their organization, 2. Their domestic partners, and 3. The international community. Organizations may refrain from policing violators if the costs to their organization’s cohesion and reputation are too high, but will seek ways to lessen criticism by domestic and international audiences.