Extrinsic and intrinsic factors influencing the positive memory bias in aging

Abstract

Emotional experiences are more likely to be remembered than more neutral, mundane ones. In young adults, negative information may be particularly memorable. Yet, an interesting change seems to happen in aging: As adults grow older, they may start remembering positive information more often than negative information. This positive memory bias in aging is commonly reported and is often explained in terms of changing time perspectives and motivation across the lifespan (i.e., Socioemotional Selectivity Theory). However, few studies have considered the basic interactions between memory and emotion that could influence this positivity bias. In this thesis, I examine whether certain factors partially independent of aging (i.e., semantic relatedness and distinctiveness, Study 1; mood, Studies 2-4), might influence the presence and magnitude of the positivity bias in memory. In Study 1, I explore the cognitive mechanisms required to produce the positivity bias and apply what is learned in this paper to investigate, in Studies 2-4, whether differences in mood could explain why the positivity bias occurs. In all studies, memory is measured using immediate free recall of positive, negative, and neutral pictures. In Study 1, I manipulate item interrelatedness (i.e., the extent of relatedness among pictures of a same category) and relative distinctiveness (i.e., the processing of a picture category at the same time as or in isolation from the others) to show that older adults’ emotional memory can be entirely explained by these two factors. The distinctive processing of positive pictures relative to other pictures is necessary for producing a positivity bias in older adults, which completely disappears when the distinctive processing of positive pictures is removed. Therefore, in subsequent studies I encourage the distinctive processing of items to increase the likelihood of observing a positivity bias and its possible interaction with mood. In Study 2, I test whether differences in mood predict differences in emotional memory bias in young and older adults using a video mood induction technique validated in a separate pilot study. In Studies 3 and 4, I further test the effect of mood on the positivity bias beyond any age-specific factors, by examining young adults only. This serves to reduce the likelihood of confounds that might exist between age groups (i.e., related to neurocognitive changes or decline), in order to study the true effects of mood on the positivity bias. In Study 3, I use a written priming task to experimentally manipulate mood and time perspective in young adults. In Study 4, I compare differences in naturally occurring moods and emotional memory in two separate young adult samples: university students and non-students. The experimental mood manipulations have minimal influence on the presence of a negativity bias in young adults (Studies 2 and 3), and influence to a small extent the memory advantage of positive over neutral material in older adults (Study 2). Non-student young adults show a similar preferential memory for positive material that is different from what is observed in university students, but this is not easily attributed to differences in mood (Study 4). In light of these results, I argue that the positivity effect in aging memory reflects a temporary contextual advantage for positive information that is not permanent or irreversible. Rather, it seems to depend in varying degrees on the context of study (i.e., relatedness and distinctiveness), mood, and the young-adult reference group. This has implications for how future research defines and studies the positivity effect in aging.