Abstract
Cooperative strategies are predicted for repeated social interactions. The recently described Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies enforce the partner’s cooperation because the ‘generous’ ZD players help their cooperative partners while ‘extortionate’ ZD players exploit their partners’ cooperation. Partners may accede to extortion because it pays them to do so, but the partner can sabotage his own and his extortioner’s score by defecting to discipline the extortioner. Thus, extortion is predicted to turn into generous and disappear. Here, we show with human volunteers that an additional monetary incentive (bonus) paid to the finally competitively superior player maintains extortion. Unexpectedly, extortioners refused to become disciplined, thus forcing partners to accede. Occasional opposition reduced the extortioners’ gain so that using extortion paid off only because of the bonus. With no bonus incentive, players used the generous ZD strategy. Our findings suggest that extortion strategies can prevail when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain.
Highlights
Cooperative strategies are predicted for repeated social interactions
If the Zero Determinant (ZD) player X chooses to extort Y, who is an ‘evolutionary' player not possessing a theory of mind and instead seeks to adjust his strategy to maximise his own score in response to whatever X is doing, Y would not try to alter X’s behaviour[8]
Contrary to extortionate behaviour a generous ZD player always starts with C, cooperates after mutual cooperation and only mildly punishes defection
Summary
Cooperative strategies are predicted for repeated social interactions. The recently described Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies enforce the partner’s cooperation because the ‘generous’ ZD players help their cooperative partners while ‘extortionate’ ZD players exploit their partners’ cooperation. Extortionate strategies, reported by Press and Dyson[7], grant a disproportionate number of high payoffs to X at Y’s expense It is, in Y’s best interest to cooperate with X because only by doing so Y is able to increase his own score. Y has a theory of mind, and sabotages both his own and X’s score by defecting, he might hope to discipline X, as in an ultimatum game[9] with X proposing an unfair ultimatum and Y declining the offer thereby sabotaging the payoffs for both players[7]. Extortioners risk being disciplined and have problems succeeding in evolving populations[11] because they end up with mutual defection when they meet each other. Contrary to extortionate behaviour a generous ZD player always starts with C, cooperates after mutual cooperation and only mildly punishes defection (see Fig. 1 for an example). The co-player’s best response to both extortion and generous strategies is to cooperate
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
