Externalist and Internalist Interpretations of Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5. The Psychology of Alexander of Aphrodisias As a Possible Remedy to the Thomistic Monopoly. Introductory Considerations

Abstract

This paper is devoted to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Exegete, whose theory is gaining popularity among Aristotelian scholars as a possible solution to manifold interpretation problems created by Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5 due to its brevity and obscurity. I recommend Alexander’s solution as a remedy for two main predicaments concerning the notorious second intellect called enigmatically nous poietikos: the mysterious (if any) function of active intellect, and Thomistic monopoly in the field of Aristotle’s psychology (and theology). In other words, I believe that the externalist interpretations which identify nous poietikos with the Deity or a noetic sphere are more appropriate than the internalist ones that include the productive mind in our mental apparatus (Aquinas being the most famous partisan of this view). This is why I believe Alexander (an externalist), who remains rather unknown to scholars focused outside ancient philosophy, should be introduced to the broader public, especially because he inspired the Arabic philosophy, which is also an alternative to internalism (often overlapping with theistic readings). This introduction, alongside shedding light on some psychological issues, is the main aim of my paper.