External shocks, policy spillovers, and veto players: (post)exceptionalist common agricultural policy and the case of the 2023-2027 reform

Abstract

ABSTRACT External shocks and policy spillovers have facilitated a gradual shift away from the exceptionalism (exclusive role of agricultural interests) in the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This article argues that post-Lisbon decision-making rules and procedures, against some of the expectations, slowed this process. First, the parallel veto-based negotiations on the bloc’s finances gave status quo actors the opportunity to influence the CAP indirectly (by blocking the redistribution of CAP funds) and directly (through package deals). Second, the co-decision procedure allowed the ministers of agriculture and the European Parliament’s Committee of agriculture to change the proposals of the more reform-minded Commission more easily. The argument is supported by the case of the CAP 2023–2027 reform, which resulted in limited changes given the Brexit-related cut in CAP funding (external shock) and the inclusion of environmental targets as part of the European Green Deal (policy spillover effects).