Abstract
Ideally, the properties of an economic mechanism should hold in a robust way across multiple equilibria and under varying assumptions regarding the information available to participants. Focusing o...
Highlights
We consider a standard position auction setting in which k positions are to be assigned to n agents in a one-to-one fashion and agents agree on the relative values of the positions
We address the question by considering variants of the three standard designs for position auctions: the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, and the generalized first-price (GFP) auction
All versions of the VCG and GSP auctions—with simplified or expressive bids, efficient or greedy allocation rule—have an efficient complete-information equilibrium with arbitrarily small revenue compared to the truthful VCG revenue [34, 16]
Summary
We consider a standard position auction setting in which k positions are to be assigned to n agents in a one-to-one fashion and agents agree on the relative values of the positions. Such a setting can be described by two vectors v = The valuation of agent i for position j is given by βjvi, and we will assume for convenience that β1 ≥ β2 ≥ · · · ≥ βk This is a one-dimensional setting, as the private information of each agent consists of a single number. Each slot comes with a click-through rate and each advertiser with a value per click
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