Exploring the promotion of green technology innovation in the new energy vehicle industry: An evolutionary game analysis.

Abstract

This paper aims to explore how to promote green technology innovation (GTI) among new energy vehicle (NEV) manufacturers and the strategic changes among the government, manufacturers, and consumers. From the perspective of evolutionary game theory, a tripartite evolutionary game model is established to analyze the influence of key factors on the tripartite strategies in the context of the government's willingness to subsidize gradually decreases. The main findings are as follows: (1) government subsidies provided to manufacturers better promote their willingness to participate in GTI. The relationship between government subsidies and GTI is not linear, and the government cannot blindly increase the level of subsidies. (2) The willingness of NEV manufacturers to engage in GTI is influenced by price and consumer purchase preferences. The higher the price of new energy vehicle using green technology (NEVG) is not better, and lowering the price of NEVGs can promote manufacturers' participation in GTI and consumers' purchase of NEVGs. (3) Increasing the mileage of NEVGs and consumers' green consumption preferences will effectively increase consumers' willingness to purchase. Accordingly, this study suggests that to enhance manufacturers' participation in GTI, the government should increase subsidies and encourage green consumption among consumers. In addition, manufacturers should focus on improving the mileage of NEVGs and reducing their prices to make them more accessible to consumers.