Abstract

This article analyzes factors relating to moderation and immoderation of post-rebel parties in power, thus making a significant departure from previous studies, which have tended to examine these from a position of political weakness. The rigorous analysis marries approaches and findings from comparative politics and Middle East studies with a view to making an original, qualitative contribution to the academic debate on the inclusion of Islamist parties in formal politics based on lessons learned from the experiences of 12 post-rebel parties across the globe, thus also breaking with the trend for single-country case studies or larger, quantitative studies. The research finds that whether post-rebel parties in power are likely to behave moderately largely depends upon the political environment at the time of the conflict’s end, i.e., when these parties first gain entry into the formal political system. Post-rebel parties entering a political system with a tradition of resolving political disagreements within the electoral arena, in which the post-rebel party faces rivalry from sizeable competitors, and where the main issue driving the post-rebel party’s support during the conflict is no longer salient, are more likely to behave inclusively and remain moderate once in power. With reference to Islamist parties, the issue thus becomes a question of how to best create an environment that facilitates Islamist moderation upon these parties’ inclusion into formal politics, rather than a debate over whether the inclusion or exclusion of such parties will lead to their moderation. This finding is likely to significantly change how scholars approach Islamist parties and their inclusion into formal politics.

Highlights

  • Over the past decades, scholars of various disciplines, most notably Middle East politics and terrorism studies, have sought to establish a conceptual framework detailing what constitutes political moderation of radical parties—and in particular of Islamist parties—which is one of the last groups of parties to be allowed entry into contemporary political systems, yet which remains understudied within the field of party politics (Rivetti & Kraetzschmar, 2018)

  • Sources: Election data was retrieved from the IPUP arline and IFES databases at http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp and http://www.electionguide.org/; 1Rival parties are defined as parties winning 10 percent or more in the previous election and competing in the first post-conflict election (Manning & Smith, 2019); *Delay between end of conflict in the first instance and the holding of multi-party elections; CPeriod of conflict; Bold highlights victory for post-rebel party; Grey shaded area shows indicators positively correlated with electoral success according to Manning and Smith (2019); Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), Union for National Progress (UPRONA), National Party (NP), Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN (UML)), Partido de Concertación Nacional (PCN), and the Nepali Congress (NC)

  • The analysis shows that post-rebel parties arriving at power in political systems where political power is mainly anchored outside of the electoral arena, i.e., in clientelism and the use of force, eventually come to rely on such methods to maintain power if not already doing so at the outset, such as for instance in the case of Burundi’s CNDD-FDD

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Scholars of various disciplines, most notably Middle East politics and terrorism studies, have sought to establish a conceptual framework detailing what constitutes political moderation of radical parties—and in particular of Islamist parties—which is one of the last groups of parties to be allowed entry into contemporary political systems, yet which remains understudied within the field of party politics (Rivetti & Kraetzschmar, 2018). 63) classic work as “any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office” Following this definition, a party can still have an armed wing and does not have to renounce violence, but it must obtain government power within the electoral process in order to qualify (Janda, 1993). These parties could potentially be ideologically radical, yet behaviourally moderate or vice versa, which is one of the reasons why the term post-rebel parties as opposed to radical, fundamentalist or anti-establishment parties are used here. The article constitutes a significant and original contribution to the conceptual debate with particular emphasis on making headway on the behavioural side of the discussion at the level of the party as a whole, i.e., the collective, given the personalistic nature of a number of the parties at the core of the analysis, party moderation at the collective level may, in practice, be down to the decisions of individual party leaders

From Post-Rebel Parties to Islamist Inclusion and Moderation
Post-Rebel Party Success at the Polls and the Issue of Political Space
A Note on Theory
A History of Violence
Problem-Solving in the Electoral Arena
Environmental Constraints and the Behaviour of Post-Rebel Parties in Power
Findings
Concluding Remarks
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call