Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle's Science of Nature par Mariska Leunissen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. 250.

Abstract

190 PHOENIX is true, then it can be coherently articulated and defended. Castagnoli acknowledges that Plato probably endorsed this view, at least implicitly, since he “never asks the portentous question ‘what if reality, in all its unintelligibility, does indeed require our silence?’” (233). It is deeply unsettling, but perhaps the answer is yes, or at least a wagging of one’s finger. In my opinion, the high point of this study is the subtle and penetrating interpretation of Sextus’ apparent acceptance of self-refutation as a dialectical tool to be employed against his opponents rather than an admission that Pyrrhonian practice logically undermines or refutes itself. The latter view is inspired in part by Sextus’ evocative metaphors, especially involving purgatives: the skeptic’s expressions can be cancelled (or destroyed) along with what they are applied to, just as purgative drugs eliminate themselves along with the offensive humors (PH 1.206; cf. PH 2.188, M 8.480). The mature skeptic, securely in possession of his tranquility, has no need of such purgatives. He will report how he is affected without thereby committing himself to any belief regarding external reality. This applies equally to his characteristic admission that none of the dogmatic claims he has so far encountered seems more persuasive than its contradictory. This admission, like all of the skeptic’s admissions, induces no disturbance in him, so it is not something he would seek to purge. Nevertheless, as Castagnoli argues, the skeptic’s opponent may stubbornly insist that the skeptic’s behavior commits him to the belief that the things he reports are as they seem. Sextus’ ingenious dialectical counter is to argue concessively: even if things are as I (the skeptic) report, for example, no more one way than another (ouden mallon), then, and only then, will my characteristic expressions and arguments be brought within their own scope. Taken as a report about how he is affected, ouden mallon does not refer to itself. Taken as a dogmatic assertion about external states of affairs, it does. But one cannot coherently maintain that things are no more one way than another, including this very state of affairs. Crucially, this is not a matter of deriving the falsity of the original assertion, but rather eliminating it altogether. One who dogmatically proposes ouden mallon ends up proposing nothing. In effect, by drawing out the dogmatist’s complaint, Sextus shows that it eliminates itself. Many readers will take issue with the details of the interpretation of specific arguments , for they are some of the most controversial in ancient philosophy. Nevertheless, developing Burnyeat’s seminal work on the topic,4 Castagnoli makes a compelling case for his main contention regarding the dialectical purpose and function of those arguments. The prose is clear and precise, if vertiginous at times given the inescapably dizzying nature of the logic. The analyses are consistently rigorous and sensitive to philological detail. Ancient Self-Refutation is a tour-de-force. Agnes Scott College Harald Thorsrud Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle's SCIENCE OF NATURE. Par Mariska Leunissen . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. 2010. Pp. 250. Aristote affirme à plusieurs reprises que tous ses prédécesseurs ont conduit leurs recherches sans une véritable compréhension de l’ensemble des causes possibles et de 4 See, especially, M. Burnyeat, “Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy,” Philosophical Review 85 (1976) 44–69. BOOK REVIEWS/COMPTES RENDUS 191 leurs interrelations systématiques. Dans le contexte de ce compte rendu je ne peux me pencher sur la question de savoir si cette opinion d’Aristote est bien fondée. Je la rappelle néanmoins pour souligner le fait que dans ses écrits Aristote présuppose la compréhension systématique des causes qui, selon lui, manquait aux enquêtes présocratiques. Autrement dit, les études aristotéliciennes présupposent une théorie de la causalité qui stipule comment établir des explications causales. La science naturelle ne fait pas exception à cette règle générale. Cette science constitue même un excellent exemple de la façon dont les écrits d’Aristote sont traversés par sa conception de la causalité. Une étude sur la...