Explaining Support for Human Rights Protections: A Judicial Role?

Abstract

Scholars have identified a number of societal features that contribute to the support of human rights. Controlling for the most prominent of these factors, we examine the degree to which judicial independence (JI) exerts an autonomous positive effect on human rights. We use a cross-sectional design, drawing on data for the 27 European Union members and its four prospective members, in conjunction with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. We find that multiple indices of JI based on expert judgment, which include institutional but predominantly behavioral measures, reveal JI producing the most powerful positive effect in the support of human rights among the variables included in the analysis. Multiple measures of JI based on public surveys of the trustworthiness of a society's judicial institutions exert a positive, but not statistically significant, effect on support of human rights. Indeed, these latter effects are eclipsed by the relative equality of a society's national executive and legislature and its GDP/capita. Surprisingly, judicial review exerts no statistically significant effect on human rights protection, counter to the conventional wisdom that has driven so many constitutional designers in the post-World War II era. Our findings suggest that, while an independent judiciary holds the greatest potential for protecting human rights, constitutional drafters should focus less on institutional elements related to judicial independence and judicial review. Rather, those crafting constitutions intended to protect human rights should look to dispersing government power by enhancing electoral competitiveness and fostering judicial independence.