Abstract
I consider various principles which might explain our intuitive obligation to rescue people from imminent death at great cost, even when the same resources could produce more benefit elsewhere. Our obligation to rescue is commonly explained in terms of the identifiability of the rescuee, but I reject this account. Instead, I offer two considerations which may come into play. Firstly, I explain the seeming importance of identifiability in terms of an intuitive obligation to prioritise life-extending interventions for people who face a high risk of an early death, and I explain this in turn with a fair innings-style principle which prioritises life-extending interventions for people expected to die young. However, this account is incomplete. It does not explain why we would devote the same resources to rescuing miners stuck down a mine even if they are elderly. We are averse to letting people die suddenly, or separated from friends and family. And so, secondly, I give a new account that explains this in terms of narrative considerations. We value life stories that follow certain patterns, classic patterns which are reflected in many popular myths and stories. We are particularly averse to depriving people of the opportunity to follow some such pattern as they approach death. This means allowing them to sort out their affairs, say goodbyes to family and friends, review their life, or come to terms with death itself. Such activities carry a lot of meaning as ways of closing our life story in the right way. So, for someone who has not been given much notice of their death, an extra month is worth much more than for other patients. Finally, I review the UK National Health Service's end of life premium, which gives priority to patients with short life expectancy. I suggest it falls short in terms of such considerations. For example, the NHS defines its timings in terms of how long the patient can expect to live as at the time of the treatment decision, whereas the timings should be specified in terms of time from diagnosis.
Highlights
In this paper I will consider whether a "rule of rescue" obligation is ever applicable in healthcare allocation
Prima facie, identifiability does not look like it can vindicate our intuitions in rule of rescue cases
Why do we spend money on treating older smokers with lung cancer rather than switching that cash to preventive measures which would produce more health benefit, and which would have stopped those individuals getting lung cancer in the first place, dramatically increasing their chance of a fair innings?33. My suggestion on this is inspired by the following finding regarding public opinion: The study results suggest that [NICE's current end of life] policy may be insufficient in two ways
Summary
In this paper I will consider whether a "rule of rescue" obligation is ever applicable in healthcare allocation. This is difficult to explain in terms of non-rescue considerations, given that the health outcomes prevented by the respective interventions are comparably severe.8 Once again, it seems that patients at risk of imminent death merit special status, intuitively.
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