Explaining Networks through Mechanisms: Vaccination, Priming and the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease Crisis

Abstract

There is an ongoing debate about whether and how the existence of policy networks can be used to explain policy outcomes. Making use of the concept of priming, it is argued here that network structures create differential opportunities for interest groups to persuade decision makers to act in particular ways. In conditions of uncertainty where there is a pressure to take immediate decisions, priming can help us to understand why some groups are more persuasive than others. This argument is developed against the backdrop of a particular puzzle: the British government's refusal to use emergency vaccination during the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 2001. This decision is routinely accounted for in terms of the bargaining strength of the National Farmers Union. Against this it is argued that farmers' influence over government policy ought to be explained primarily in terms of the way they were able to prime particular arguments and so help persuade the government to act in particular ways.