Compromise and Consensus: Toward a Two-Track Model of Deliberation

Abstract

In this article, we discuss the relationship between deliberative democracy, compromise, and consensus. According to one view, deliberation should aim exclusively at compromise (compromise-only view). According to another view, compromise processes are incompatible with with the epistemic logic of deliberation (no-compromise view). Against the compromise-only view, we argue that it relies on a misunderstanding of the role of consensus and fails to capture how consensus-oriented deliberations are conducive to important learning processes. Against the no-compromise view, we argue that it mistakenly envisages deliberation in purely epistemic terms and that this misunderstands the point and purpose of deliberative democracy as a practical political ideal. By adopting a distinct second-order perspective, we demonstrate how compromise processes can be rendered compatible with a deliberative orientation to finding the best political outcomes. Based on these discussions, we articulate a two-track model of deliberation that shows how deliberative democracy can be dually committed to compromise and consensus.