Abstract
After 2003, Australia's domestic jihadist plots shifted from being externally guided to being entirely self-starting, which was out of sync with international trends. To identify the causes behind this turning point, this article first provides a brief overview of jihadist activity in Australia, showing how the post-2003 shift differentiates it from comparable countries. The article then examines several potential explanations for the shift that prove insufficient. Following that, the article demonstrates that the shift occurred because key facilitators between Australia and South Asia were removed or deterred. This factor, combined with the limited strategic importance of Australia, low levels of jihadist radicalization, and limited diaspora involvement from the countries most central to Al Qaeda operations, explains Australia's specific pattern of jihadist activity.
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