Experience and Ontology in Anselm’s Argument

Abstract

In this article, I examine two ways to approach Anselm’s argument: as a logical demonstration and as a persuasive piece of reasoning—one that notably persuaded Anselm himself. First, I follow Ermanno Bencivenga and argue that Anselm’s argument is a logical illusion. The deduction is not simply invalid, nor is it simply unsound; instead, it appeals to two mutually inconsistent sets of assumptions, each of which is rationally defensible. Consequently, the argument emerges as either valid or sound, but not both simultaneously. I also argue that this peculiar piece of reasoning should not be classified as an “ontological” argument. When interpreted as a persuasive piece of reasoning, the argument appeals to experience—an experience of something alluded to by the phrase “something than which nothing greater can be thought.” Here, the logical apparatus primarily serves to channel and refine contemplation on this experience.