Expectations from Estimative Intelligence and Anticipatory Foreign Policy: A Realistic Appraisal 1

Abstract

The chapter sets out a common conceptual and theoretical framework for the postmortems analysis and identification of lessons to be learned in the overall volume: What can we realistically expect from estimative intelligence and anticipatory foreign policy? To what extent and when is being surprised to be expected and excused? When do performance shortcomings point to underlying shortcomings that might be avoided or addressed through learning the right lessons? It draws not only on the literature in strategic surprise and postmortems in intelligence studies but considers also insights from other literatures in in foresight, risk and emergency management, and public administration about the role of experts, expertise and learning. It develops a normative model of evidence-sensitive anticipatory foreign policy. A second section looks at the specific challenges for estimative intelligence when seeking to minimise surprise in foreign affairs. It provides a taxonomy of different degrees and types of surprise and discusses when being surprised might be condonable or expected. Thirdly, it investigates how to identify the most important causes of any performance problems in intelligence-policy nexus. Finally, it looks at the specific challenge of identifying and learning the right lessons and how to prioritise among recommendations for change.