Exit from Joint-decision Problems?

Abstract

Over the last decade, the European Union (EU) has faced a multitude of crises. Importantly, the various crises have led to different outcomes: Whereas the Eurozone crisis, for example, led to more European integration, the Schengen crisis arguably resulted in a partial European disintegration. Applying models of joint-decision problems in the EU, this paper analyses why and how these two crises led to divergent outcomes. It finds that higher levels of functional pressures, higher capacities of supranational agency, and more room for package deals enabled the EU to exit from joint-decision problems in the Eurozone crisis, whereas these and other potential exit mechanisms were widely unavailable in the Schengen crisis. Looking explicitly at the (missing) availability of exit mechanisms from joint-decision problems, this paper goes beyond the application of the usual European integration theories, which struggle to explain the variation in crisis outcomes. Furthermore, the paper makes a contribution to the more recent academic discussions on European integration/ disintegration, on the one hand, and the legitimacy-effectiveness gap, on the other hand.