Existential disturbances: the beginnings of leisure?

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe purpose of this article is to contend with, not answer, a question related to happiness. Specifically, we are interested in whether leisure and happiness are possible when feelings stand in stark contrast to those conventionally associated with these terms. Is leisure or happiness possible when one is existentially shaken or disturbed? We contend that it is; that existential disturbances may be necessary as a beginning for leisure, which can then lead to happiness under certain conditions. We begin by situating this claim in an exploration of the early scholarship of Pieper (1998a) and de Grazia (1964), foregrounding their work as appealing to a Classical leisure ideal. We then contrast their work to relatively more recent contributions, particularly those of Neulinger (1974; 1981; 1990), which we interpret as appealing to an idea of leisure, instrumentalized in pragmatic projects useful to legitimize its academic study. Thus, we critically reflect upon what was lost or gained, enhanced or diminished, in these varied interpretations of leisure and happiness. Finally, we conclude with anecdotes from a class we recently taught on leisure and happiness where students’ reflections often challenged how we think of leisure and happiness in relation to so-called negative feelings. Ultimately, we do not advocate a return to a Classical ideal, but attempt to provoke critical reflection with regard to how leisure scholarship pursues happiness.