Exemplars and Scientific Change

Abstract

A recurrent theme in the “new philosophy of science” is the importance of temporally extended conceptual entities termed variously disciplinary matrixes (Kuhn 1970), research programs (Lakatos 1970), scientific disciplines (Toulmin 1972), theories (McMullin 1976), and research traditions (Laudan 1977). Each of these macro-conceptual entities contains a rich heterogeneity of constituent elements. For example, Kuhn's (1970, pp. 183-187) disciplinary matrixes (“paradigm” in his global sense) include symbolic generalizations, metaphysical views, models, values, and exemplars as concrete problem solutions (“paradigm” in the narrow sense). All of the conceptual entities listed above are “historical entities” or “continuants”, the sorts of things that can change through time. Toulmin (1972) and Laudan (1977) permit total changeover in elements just so long as the transformation is gradual and the system remains cohesive in the process. Others, such as Lakatos (1970), insist on the retention of a “hard core” of some kind.