Abstract
AbstractA version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) claims that one is only blameworthy for actions which one was able to avoid. Much of the discussion about PAP concerns Frankfurt’s counterexamples to it. After fifty years of refined debates, progress might seem hopeless. Yet, we can make headway by asking: “what’s our reason for believing PAP?” The best answer is this: lacking eligible alternatives—alternatives whose cost is not too high to reasonably opt for—is a good excuse. Yet, this principle is subject to straightforward counterexamples, unless it is given an epistemicised reading. And in this latter case, it does not support PAP. So, PAP is unsupported, at least for now.
Highlights
Several philosophers still endorse a version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), according to which one is only blameworthy for actions one was able to avoid—that is, actions to which one had alternatives
(3) And, in this latter case, the principle that lacking eligible alternatives is a good excuse provides no support for PAP and is not a good reason for believing it
I turn to the second premise, which claims that, lacking eligible alternatives is not a good excuse, unless we understand eligibility differently than we have so far
Summary
Several philosophers still endorse a version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), according to which one is only blameworthy for actions one was able to avoid—that is, actions to which one had alternatives. (1) Our (good) reason for believing PAP is, if anything, that lacking eligible alternatives is a good excuse. (3) And, in this latter case, the principle that lacking eligible alternatives is a good excuse provides no support for PAP and is not a good reason for believing it. Our reason for believing that we are not blameworthy for unavoidable actions is that lacking eligible alternatives is a good excuse. This is crucial for my purpose, so let me clarify how PAP and PEAP relate. I turn to the second premise, which claims that, lacking eligible alternatives is not a good excuse, unless we understand eligibility differently than we have so far. I suspect that there are other reconstructions of Alvarez’s and Steward’s argument in the vicinity. I shall leave this aside for the rest of this paper, but it strikes me as a promising avenue for the PAP defender, albeit one which comes with significant theoretical commitments
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
