Examining behavioral strategies of residents and enterprises in the context of subsidy phase-outs for waste incineration power plants

Abstract

An evolutionary game model was utilized in this study to simulate logical behaviors for bounded rational players in a market-oriented environment, centered on the phasing out of subsidies for waste incineration power plants. The findings reveal that (1) enterprises are willing to leverage market mechanisms to address operational requirements through environmentally conscious innovations. These include reducing carbon footprint, conserving energy, and strictly monitoring pollution emissions. (2) Residents tend to adopt cooperative strategies in the game over the long term, experiencing reduced waste disposal fees and increased overall benefits. The community's support notably increases as the company lowers fees to just 40% of the initial rate. (3) Both players demonstrate marked sensitivity to the corporate revenue augmentation factor; when it surpasses a threshold of 1.025, the company can sustain technological advancements and reach equilibrium. (4) The market-oriented ecological compensation bolsters enterprise-community cooperation, effectively reducing public opposition to waste incineration facilities. An innovative ecological compensation model was established in this study, which integrates positive and negative external influences while balancing the principles of compensating victims and ensuring beneficiaries' contributions.