Abstract

The security policy of the Empire of Japan in the post-World War II period is a subject of interest among both policymakers and International Relations scholars. There are two basic reasons for that. The first one comes from the traditionally important position occupied by this state in regional balance of power in Asia. The second reason comes from a fact, that at the beginning of the Cold War, Japanese leaders adapted a peculiar foreign policy and security strategy, based on disavowal of the instrument of force and limitation of the defence potentian to the indispensable minimum. This policy stood in contrast to with the common practices of the Cold War international order. It was also difficult to explain from the perspective of traditional IR theory (based on political realism), which states that the rise of state's economic power should lead to great power aspirations and intensive arms build-up. It is intriguing, that the fundamental transformation of the international order, brought by the end of the Cold War, initiated a process of change in Japanese security policy, which leads in exactly opposite direction.

Highlights

  • The security policy of the Empire of Japan in the post-World War II period is a subject of lively interest among both policymakers and scholars in the field of international relations

  • The second reason comes from a fact, that at the beginning of the cold war, Japanese leaders adapted a peculiar foreign policy and security strategy, based on disavowal of the instrument of force and limitation of the defense potential to the indispensable minimum

  • This policy stood in stark contrast with the common practices of the cold war international order

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Summary

Szerzej

I¿ by3a swoistym prekursorem nowego myœlenia o kwestiach bezpieczeñstwa, które rozpowszechni3o siê w doktrynach innych pañstw (oraz dyscyplinie studiów strategicznych) dopiero po zakoñczeniu zimnej wojny. Jak zauwa¿y3 badacz tego zagadnienia Yasuhiro Izumikawa, postawy antymilitarystyczne w spo3eczeñstwie japoñskim by3y pochodn[1] trzech czynników: pacyfizmu, antytradycjonalizmu oraz obaw przed uwik3aniem w konflikty prowadzone przez amerykañskiego sojusznika[9]. Jednak pozycja socjalistów i komunistów, tak w parlamencie, jak i wynikaj1ca z poparcia wp3ywowych œrodowisk opiniotwórczych, by3a na tyle silna, i¿ rz1dz1cy nie mogli ignorowaæ ich stanowiska, tak¿e (a mo¿e nawet przede wszystkim) w zakresie polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeñstwa. Ostatecznie CLB orzek3o, i¿ zapisy KNZ daj[1] Japonii prawo do zbiorowej samoobrony, jednak na mocy zapisów konstytucyjnych nie mo¿e ona z niego korzystaæ.

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