Evolutionary Snowdrift Game with Time-Varying Neighbor Promotes Cooperation

Abstract

Addressed in this paper is the issue of how to induce cooperation among selfish individuals by changing the number of interaction neighbors in the evolutionary snowdrift game. Quite a few mechanisms that promote cooperation have been intensely investigated in the evolutionary game, and each player has the same number of neighbors to play, which is inconsistent with most actual situations in society. Here, we take into account that there are fixed neighbors and time-varying neighbors in the snowdrift game. Each individual has the same number of fixed neighbors, and time-varying neighbors can be randomly selected from the fixed neighbors. The time-varying neighbors constantly change in the evolutionary process. The results of Monte Carlo simulations reveal that the cooperation level of the evolutionary snowdrift game that the introduction of time-varying neighbors is significantly improved. Further speaking, our results can provide a theoretical basis for promoting group cooperation in society.