Abstract
Environmental regulations of different intensities may have different impacts on polluting enterprises. The purpose of this article is to analyze how different environmental regulations affect the pollution discharge strategies of papermaking enterprises. By establishing an evolutionary game model between the government environmental regulation intensities and the pollutant emissions from papermaking enterprises, this thesis further solves the model and performs stability analysis and finally uses MATLAB to conduct simulation studies. And the researching results show that papermaking enterprises will take risks to choose the illegal pollutant discharge strategies when the illegal profits are large. Further analysis shows that the increase in the successful probability of the strong environmental regulations does not necessarily force papermaking enterprises to choose to comply with pollution discharge regulations. However, papermaking enterprises may choose to comply with discharge pollution regulations not only by increasing the successful probability of strong environmental regulations but also by increasing the rewards and punishments for papermaking enterprises as well as by increasing the probability of reporting violations of pollutants. Based on the above results, the author proposes several countermeasures, such as establishing a specialized pollution monitoring agency, encouraging third-party supervision, reporting pollution behaviors, and increasing penalties for polluting companies for violations. China is in a critical period of transition from rapid development to high-quality development. It will provide some reliable references for the construction of a green economy and an ecological economy that the characteristics and relationships between the intensity of government environmental regulations and corporate pollution emissions revealed in this article.
Highlights
When the economy developed into the post-industrial era, the environmental pollution had become a problem that people had to face on the road of economic development
Ε < ηβ − α < 0, that is, the product of the probability of a papermaking enterprise being reported for violations and the probability of successful weak environmental regulations is less than the probability of successful strong environmental regulations, so the government is more inclined to choose strong
If the product of the probability of a papermaking enterprises being reported for violations and the successful probability of weak environmental regulations is greater than the successful probability of strong environmental regulations, the government is more inclined to choose weak environmental regulatory strategies
Summary
When the economy developed into the post-industrial era, the environmental pollution had become a problem that people had to face on the road of economic development. Based on the above facts, it can be seen that, as the worst-hit area of pollutant discharge, papermaking enterprises will inevitably be affected by different environmental regulatory intensities. It is still needed to be further explored how different environmental regulatory intensities affect the choice of corporate pollutant emission strategies. By constructing evolutionary game models, many scholars have analyzed the strategic choices between environmental regulations and corporate pollution. The successful probability of different environmental regulation intensities will affect the pollution emission strategies of polluting companies. By further considering the changes in the government environmental regulation intensities and the successful probability of different environmental regulation intensities, this thesis uses evolutionary game theory, to study the strategy choices of the government and polluting companies in different situations.
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