Abstract
Environmental pollution has become an important obstacle on the path of ecological civilization construction, and it is urgent to control environmental pollution. By establishing an evolutionary game model, this thesis focuses on analyzing how paper-making enterprises choose their own emission reduction strategies under the reward and punishment mechanism. It further analyzes how social welfare changes under the reward and punishment mechanism, and finally through simulation research, this thesis analyzes the evolutionary paths of paper-making enterprises’ pollution emission strategies under the reward and punishment mechanism. The results of the reward and punishment mechanism are as follows: under the static reward and punishment mechanism, the game system will repeatedly oscillate around a point. There is no stable equilibrium point at this time. However, under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, the game system will tend to a stable equilibrium point. The results of social welfare analysis show that high-intensity rewards will reduce the amount of pollution discharged by paper-making enterprises, thereby maximizing social welfare. On the contrary, when paper-making enterprises discharge a large amount of pollution, they will be subject to high-intensity penalties. When facing high-intensity punishments, paper-making enterprises will tend to not to discharge. So social welfare is also maximized. The simulation research results show that reasonable punishment strategies are more effective than reward ones. Based on this, the author proposes countermeasures, such as establishing a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism, reasonably determining the reward and punishment intensity for polluting enterprises. The emission reduction strategies of paper-making enterprises will be affected by the government’s reward and punishment mechanism. A deep study of its internal mechanism is not only of great significance for pollution control but also of great significance for the development of a green economy.
Highlights
Pollutant emissions from paper-making enterprises have always been a major source of environmental pollution due to their volatility and difficulty in eradicating them. e pollution caused by pollutant emissions from paper-making enterprises still occupies an important position in the ecological environmental pollution
Under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, the evolution path of the government environmental supervision department and the paper-making enterprises will gradually converge to a point
Because once pollutants are discharged, they may face a huge amount of pollution punishment. rough the analysis of social welfare maximization, it can be seen that the amount of pollutant emissions of papermaking enterprises is inversely related to the rewards they receive
Summary
Pollutant emissions from paper-making enterprises have always been a major source of environmental pollution due to their volatility and difficulty in eradicating them. e pollution caused by pollutant emissions from paper-making enterprises still occupies an important position in the ecological environmental pollution. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society government’s determination and perseverance to control environmental pollution It regulates or restricts polluting enterprises by increasing rewards or penalties for them. These measures have achieved certain results, the internal mechanism and logic of the paper-making enterprises still needs to be studied when they choose their own pollution emission strategies under the government’s reward and punishment mechanism. It makes the mechanism analysis of how different types of reward and punishment mechanisms affect the pollution emission strategies of paper-making enterprises.
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