Abstract
High-tech enterprises, as the key subjects that can stimulate innovation vitality and promote innovation-driven development strategies in China, require government guidance for their innovative activities. However, the existing research has not answered the issue of how the government behavior activates the innovation ability of high-tech enterprises and what is the internal mechanism. As such, this paper takes government participation in high-tech enterprises as its research object, constructs an evolutionary game model of government participation in enterprise innovation, analyzes the internal mechanism of improvements to high-tech enterprises’ innovation ability under government tax and fee policy incentives and regulatory measures, and uses MATLAB numerical simulation to verify the results. The research shows that (1) increasing the general corporate income tax rate and reducing the high-tech corporate income tax rate can promote the transformation of general enterprises into high-tech enterprises and encourage enterprises to engage in scientific and technological innovation activities. However, when the high-tech corporate income tax rate is lower than 0.1, the marginal effect will be reduced. (2) Increasing the deduction coefficient and amortization coefficient can make high-tech enterprises more motivated to participate in innovation activities and thus render enterprise innovation more lucrative. (3) Increasing administrative penalties from regulatory authorities can promote the development of innovative activities in high-tech enterprises, but their intensity must be controlled within a reasonable range. The presented results have reference value for the adjustment of tax and fee policies among high-tech enterprises.
Highlights
In the context of the new normal of economic development, to further transform the structure of economic development and find new forms of kinetic energy, China has implemented an innovation-driven development strategy to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship in its population
Innovation activities need to be guided by the government in the midst of highly complex modern technology and uncertain trends of economic development
The motivations of this paper are summarized as follows: how to clearly describe the behavior of government and enterprise? how to examine the game behavior process between them? and what kind of behavior is most conducive to enterprise innovation and maximization of social benefits? To respond to these, this paper introduces the evolutionary game theory to model the behavior of mutual influence between government and high-tech enterprises and analyze the evolution process and equilibrium point of the game behavior between them
Summary
In the context of the new normal of economic development, to further transform the structure of economic development and find new forms of kinetic energy, China has implemented an innovation-driven development strategy to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship in its population. The government will consider means to adjust tax and fee policies and regulatory measures to maximize the innovation capabilities of enterprises and maximize the benefits to society Both parties continue to adjust their behavior strategies through information acquisition and experiential learning until they reach an equilibrium state. (1) To construct the evolutionary game model of analyzing the behavior of mutual influence between government and high-tech enterprises on innovation activity. E rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 conducts the literature review, including the research on the evolutionary game and the impact of the government’s tax policy on the innovation of high-tech enterprises.
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