Evolutionary game analysis of state inspection behaviour for coal enterprise safety based on system dynamics

Abstract

Safety inspection is an important ways to secure the safe production of coal mining enterprises. A host of scholars to date have focused on studying the safety inspection from the traditional game theory point of view, which is not consistent with the actual situation in terms of the assumptions of “fully rational participants” and “symmetric information”. Furthermore, the long-term dynamic game analysis under bounded rationality has not been considered. Therefore, in view of the insufficiency of the above mentioned research, this paper analyses the state inspection behaviour for coal mine safety from the perspective of an evolutionary game and combines the system dynamics (SD) with the concept of dynamic evolution to model and analyse the above long-term dynamic game process. The results show that there are three scenarios of the evolutionary game behaviour and two evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), and ESSs are closely related to the inspection cost, bribes, rewards, expected image loss, coal enterprise penalty, and the National Coal Mine Safety Administration (NCMSA) penalty. Furthermore, decreasing the bribes or inspection cost or increasing the rewards, image loss, coal enterprise penalty, or NCMSA penalty would help the NCMSA conscientiously perform its inspection functions.